

# Destructive Devotion: With Friends Like Us, Does Jung Need Enemies?<sup>1</sup>

By Beverley Zabriskie, C.S.W.

## Abstract

Like psychoanalysis, analytical psychology is primarily a language praxis, but its embrace of the psyche includes emphases on image, emotion, and process within and between intrapsychic and transference fields. Several questions are pursued: Do current practitioners of analytical psychology adequately amplify and extend Jung's thought in the contemporary context? Do we sufficiently describe our clinical process as a discernible practice community? Do we make accessible analytical psychology's perspective on intrapsychic and collective issues? Current psychoanalytic and neuroscientific approaches resonate with Jung's empirical understanding of depth analysis and his intuitive speculations about the psyche. Some historical and contemporary analogies and parallels with Jung's hypotheses are reviewed.

Keywords: language, image, clinical process, analytical psychology, psychoanalysis, neuroscience.

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Beverley Zabriskie, C.S.W., is a Jungian Analyst in private practice in New York, where she is on the faculty of the C. G. Jung Institute. Her recent publications include "The Psyche as a Process" (*Psychoanalytic Perspectives*, Summer, 2000), "Transference and Dream in Illness: Waxing Psyche, Waning Body" (*Journal of Analytical Psychology*, vol. 45, no. 1, 2000), and "A Meeting of Rare Minds" (the Introduction to *Atom and Archetype: The Pauli-Jung Letters*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

My title and this paper emerged from private musings on our professional matters. It came from tracing the stirrings and the rumbles in our collective air; from tracking where the fixed has become volatile, and the volatile fixed. It was provoked by questions about the current state of analytical psychology; our presentation of its depth dynamics and perspectives through our literature, training, and participation in psychoanalytic discourse.

It asks if we function as an analytic school with a cogent curriculum, vital stance, and theoretical identity. It probes whether we present as a discernible *practice* community, with a communicable interaction with mind and an effective impact on the study of human psychology. It wonders if our intimations about the interplay between immediate personal experience and timeless impersonal reality resonate with the queries of our philosophies, with analogies drawn from the constructs of our sciences, with the images of our arts and patterns of our technologies.

In physicist David Bohm's language, it inquires whether, in the continuing explication of the implicate order, the assumptions of analytical psychology will endure?

Finally, it presses whether we have adequately presented the moral imagination which ultimately informed Jung, and which a depth exploration of world affairs demands.

For the Cambridge congress, I have been asked to arc my questions and bend

my thoughts to the context of analytical psychology and psychoanalysis. I do so with a caveat. Given the current volatility in the various schools of psychoanalysis, other than a shared construct of an unconscious with its own dynamics; given the essential fluidity in analytical psychology's approach to psyche as a progressive process, and as a multiplicity within a unity, we are referring to two moving targets around a third moving target, which we signify as "psyche." Ten months before his death, Jung (1975) wrote: "When I say 'Psyche' I mean something unknown, to which I give the name 'Psyche'" (p. 583).

Such giving of names, and putting into words, is the essential tool of psychological theory and practice. And so I look first to language, mindful again of the alchemical dictum: to follow where the fixed moves to the volatile, and pursue where the volatile reverts to the fixed. As the issues in a depth analysis are both collective and personal, and so "represent a supreme responsibility," (Jung, 1946, p. 235), I will end with a glance at our part in the larger conversations of our time.

## Language

We know, from various disciplines, that identity depends on language. Language, like memory, promotes a sense of self, and creates community. It fosters personal presence, allows pride of place, and gives discourse its context.

Language, said Jung, begins where dance ends. It starts when movement and gesture can no longer transmit what seeks expression. Of "the movements of mood," "their ups and downs," "the collapsing and then the coming up and unfolding," Jung (1997) remarked:

*The original roots of all language were expressions of . . . such movements. Language is . . . a sort of motor phenomenon, speech is a dance; you imitate the movements of nature as you imitate the noises of nature. (p. 1075)*

Language—with its "turns" of phrase, "leaps" of syntax, collapses" of meaning—expresses moods, mental states, and motions. It emerges from emotion, embracing eros, enfolding logos. It bears what is held in body, gathered in memory, and matters to mind.

A mother tongue suggests the nuances of source, connection, value. The phrases of a fatherland imply norms and goals. Language, then is an incarnation—into personhood, kinship, and fabric.

When rooted, language thrusts up our past. When responding to inner states and outer surrounds, it engages the present. Its relevance and vitality depends on the sap flowing between its roots and branches, between its sturdy sources and plastic potential. Like dance and music, language conveys the personal and local, and intimates the common and universal. Without transmission, these fail to thrive, or do not survive.

When displaced by a dominant language, traditional tongues do not grapple with the immediate. With the commercial dominance of English, and soon Chinese, by this century's end, half of the now current 6500 languages will not be spoken, nor be heard. At the same time, ethnic groups are reclaiming the "splinter" tongues of parochial dialects, even if these further fracture their link with the world.

If a once vital language is cut from its roots, it dies on the vine. Through

either diffusion or constriction, it gets disembodied, loses its guts. When subsumed by an imported tongue, once-primal words are blunted, relinquish or even reverse meaning. Language then loses its mind and memory.

If not responsive and expansive, if not interacting with the now, the new, and the newly known, language languishes. Confined to small circles, language spirals in on itself. Words and phrases get petrified, reified, opaque and concrete.

When out of time, a tongue coagulates around old contents, congeals around past sentiments, is buried in the embedded. Framed more by the past than the stirrings of the present, mind gets skewered to static meanings and archaic analogies. Concepts no longer conceive and concerns become precious, removed from new questions that emerge from new answers. Language then loses fluidity, and currency.

Whether ethnic or professional, language can suffocate in the archaic, drown in the general, splinter in the provincial. While various forms of “psychology” approach the human personality through different means—statistics, measurable behaviors, timed responses—formal depth analysis has depended on language. As cultural critic George Steiner (1991) writes, “Psychoanalysis is, *in toto*, a language art,” for “human consciousness is scripted and made intelligible by semantic decipherment” (p. 107). We might expect the depth analytic schools to share their perceptions and semantics, making translation of our “language art” redundant.

With more awareness of psyche’s base in brain and body, we might expect psychoanalytic conceits to be empirical, objective, and thus shared.

But just as neuroscience scans and reveals many arenas in the brain, Jung (1975) suggests, our “basic nature is not a oneness . . . [but] a multitude of the most contradictory instincts or impulses” (p. 1063).

As psychology is the study of the psyche by the psyche, the range of depth psychologies attest to psyche’s multiplicity as subject, and disclose psyche’s multiplicity as object. We find not only a multiplicity of emphases, perspectives, and vectors, but many meanings even to the analyses’ shared words. In our different analytic traditions, our common terms, such as “Psyche”, “Unconscious”, “Consciousness,” and “Dream”, may not signify the same phenomena. So in our efforts at professional exchange, we are often divided by the same language. As we seek to widen the dance’s circle, we may each be dancing to a different tune.

In psychoanalytic perspectives, we hear developmental emphases and reductive inflections in diagnosis and transference interpretations. In its turn, analytical psychology offers a perception of psyche as also synthetic, progressive, and teleological, and adds the dimensions of a collective and archetypal unconscious.

Without extra effort to communicate the consequent differences of understanding and meaning, we can easily erect new towers of psychobabble. To make relevant sense, we need continually to probe our own terms, sensitive that in a dynamic Jungian “language art,” context determines definition. Ego, for instance, is a central quantum, bundle of energy, or complex when we work for *its* development. But when we focus on a psyche’s individuation, ego is relativized as one pole vis-a-vis a larger sense of self. When, why,

and how this occurs belongs to our art and our craft.

Within our own circle, misplaced and unsought-devotion to Jung in his own time and place might have us simply repeat his references, mimic his accents, confine ourselves to his amplifications. Seeking to transcend the reductive in our work, we reduce ourselves if we entangle ourselves in emotional and intellectual binds to our beginnings. We might then keep the prime matter of our psychology intact, but lose or distort its spirit. Ideas then run aground in the literal, or thoughts become airy and words sound “flakey.” Faith replaces exploration; therapy becomes liturgy.

But when we engage psyche as an ongoing and relevant process, we pursue new entries into old forms: ego, unconscious, complex, shadow, anima, animus, coniunctio, self, archetype. The mythopoetic mother tongue carries our instinctive and emotional sources, while modern mind moves forward with radical reinterpretations and apt analogies.

With relevance, in context, we then say what we mean and mean what we say; say what we do, and do what we say. To use American slang, we “talk the talk, and walk the walk.”

## Practice

To do so, we need more than wide theoretical sweeps. If we have a discipline and practice, there must be witness. Whether Jungian *practice* continues as such depends on our offices. It is not assured.

Steiner (1991) comments that psychoanalysis is not only “a language art” but also “a language praxis.” “Psychoanalysis,” he writes, “is as

immediate to word and syntax as mining is to the earth” (p. 107). In the consulting room, we follow the veins of personal reference, plumb immediate associations, and ground these in individual soil. We hear flesh made into word as our patients’ experience finds expression. We hear how body speaks, mind talks, and psyche insists. Over the time of the telling, we note how biography is altered through reflection.

As analysts, we listen to language in the doing of our work, and invoke it for the telling. Our other tools—body sensations, emotions, images, and silent play—also move toward description in speech.

Yet, given our privileging of narrative, comparatively few of our current texts tell of the excited points of the analytic hour, the charged field of the analytic relationship. Few transmit the progressive thrust of psyche, the quantum complexity of our sessions, and the timeless ethos of transference, wherein past, present and future coexist in our consulting rooms. Few reveal what Jung (1946) called “the most secret, painful, intense, delicate, shamefaced, timorous, grotesque, unmoral, and at the same time the most sacred feelings which go to make up the indescribable and inexplicable wealth of human relationship” (p. 171).

We can all cite exceptions, treasured testimonies of the ins and outs, ups and downs of analytic process. But while we are a creative community, with many worthy works, our texts tend toward large motifs, or themes directed to the lay public. While we find motifs extracted from practice, I and other readers for two English-language Jungian journals, London’s established *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, and the new New York *Journal of Jungian*

*Theory and Practice*, are struck by a scarcity of contemporary Jungian case process, written by analysts for analysts. (I wonder if this so for our journals in other languages.)

This is not at issue if we are a cultural movement, as Wolfgang Pauli thought we ought to be. Pauli expected Jungian concepts of the unconscious would not develop within the narrow frame of therapeutic applications (Jaffe, 1972, p.43). Instead, he opined that “their merging with the general current of science in investigating the phenomena of life (would be) of paramount importance for them.” He argued that “Jungian psychology should be transformed into a philosophy” (Sieg, 1991, p.56).

But as analysts we witness psychic change as a patient becomes self-possessed. We trace how a life’s scenario is altered through extracting the seeds of self both from the givens of personal history and the drivenness of impersonal motifs. And so we disagree with Pauli’s perception.

Yet, historically, we Jungians do not present the astonishing movements—or static moments—in analytic process with the dedicated frequency and currency of other psychoanalysts. Perhaps our presentations of practice fall through the cracks of false dualisms and splintered sensibilities. Along one fault line, the “developmental” and “progressive” are seen as contrary, rather than on a continuum of emphases and timing. Along another fault, “clinical” has come to mean an opposite to Jungian process. Also, “clinical” and “archetypal” are seen as separate. This implies that a transferential focus and archetypal sensibility cannot coexist in the consulting room. Yet if the expectation values of arche-

typal fields are at the core of complexes and the anticipations between analyst and analysand, how can these be separate and unrelated?

If revisioned and reframed therapy is deemed apostasy, and analytical psychology’s language rigidifies into an arcane dialect, some of us become occult. Others, meanwhile, avoid traditional terms and phrases, suppressing ancestral accents, hoping to pass.

Recently, our patients and process seem increasingly to be framed in derivative models and terms. In a slow drift toward the mainstream, we may be floating far from a recognizable, consensual analytical psychology, our core conceits drowning in amalgams so liquid and loose that their core dissolves. Rather than speak from close to our bones and reflect from near our well’s bottom, we present patient and process in borrowed phrases and purloined words.

Even at our institutes, analysis may be parsed *only* through other perspectives, as if to be non-Jungian is to be clinical, as if others’ scripts are scientific, while ours are fantasy; as if others terms are true and ours only jargon. But reactive dismissal is also a chain to the past, choking creativity, and settling for derivative terminology and an unsynthesized sense of psyche. Meanwhile, as at the valuable crossover JAP conferences, we hear psychoanalysts repeat Jung’s insights, often without attribution. Others approach, as we seem to distance.

### Pop Jung

When professional muteness leaves a vacuum, a “dumbed down” nightmare version of a “pop” Jung is taken as modern analytical psychology.

In this un-alchemy, gold is turned into lead, and the way stations of the *Rosarium* are reversed.

In these spins of our theory, intrapsychic dynamism either rigidifies or get flabby. Subjective feeling is taken as truth. Intuition, only one of four ego functions, is privileged as a passport to depth. Body's sensations are made into x-ray vision. The play among Jung's "all kinds of opposites" collapses into rigid mental dualisms.

Shadow is seen as immoral rather than unclaimed. Dreams of others—or of the analyst—are taken as dreams *about* others, about the analyst, rather than a stretch toward oneself. The animate is made unlively, as anima and animus, carriers of different forms of experience, are stuffed back into gender's stockings and socks, or made psychic chaperones who guard against meeting flesh and blood others. The search for psyche—always ego's risk—transmutes into a search for safety. The inner alignment of individuation is misconstrued as schizoid isolation.

Jung (1997) evoked "examples and analogies to distort truth" and thus make it a "lesser truth easier to understand," "dimmer," and so "more accessible to interpretation" (p. 677). But when amplification and analogy are taken literally, the "as if" becomes eccentric reality. Workshop participants then go searching for their archetypes, rather than sweating to release themselves from the archetypal patterns that have seized them and would suck their individuality.

The collective unconscious becomes a cultural museum of images from other times and places, rather than the soil from which each generation produces images akin to those shaped across the generations in response to

common human challenge. Whereas Jung insisted that the revealed is an elevation of the experienced, the experienced is elevated to a truth rather than one reality. Meaning, the numen and synchronicity are sought and placed outside, rather than recognized as the human capacity to grant value. The psychological experience of god as a psychic image of the intuition of wholeness turns into a Self evoked as an immutable God. The unconscious itself is idealized or reified, its intimations so etched in stone that its stirrings gets fixed in—or removed from—time.

While Jung (1997) suggested that "we analyze dreams not in order to learn about particular matters but to learn about the relationship of the unconscious to these matters" (p. 1356), dreams are taken as dogma, commandment, or prophecy, an answer rather than question or comment. Absolute weight is then given to what is simply to be weighed, uncoupling the *coniunctio between* an active, alert ego and a dynamic and processional unconscious. The progressive psyche is reduced; the post-Jungian reverts to the pre-Jungian.

If psychoanalysts perceive these misperceptions to be our theory, there is no set point for professional exchange. For in these undoings, there is little of psyche as the living complexity met in practice. There is minimal sense of what Jung termed psychization, wherein psyche converts events to experience, makes personal sense of the senseless, gathers energy into image for the sake of internal process and relational growth.

Both Jungian and psychoanalytic theoreticians argue that the analyst's version of an individual process, like the patient's, is arbitrary, influenced by predispositions and selective memory.

Yet the disclosure of how the analyst's psyche, like the patient's, is also both subject and object offers glimpses into process more compelling than theory.

Noting the differences in our ways of work, more than remarking on the similarities, we gain awareness of the personal equation that permits conscious practice.

Without analysts' narratives of current cases, we will not know how analytical psychology is practiced in the twenty-first century. Making our internal grunting audible and our mental dances visible, showing how we plod in ignorance toward a suddenness of seeing, we honor what we encounter and exhibit how we endure until realization, what Fred Plaut (1999) calls "the surprise." At the least, this reveals an awareness of an unconscious. When it lurks out of sight, it may obstruct, distort, upset. Once seen, it may expand, reframe, and reorient.

By following a wide, dynamic, and inclusive third way that avoids both fundamentalism and disownment, we analysts may pursue psyche on a Jungian course, chart Jungian practice, and pass it on in honed language. Neither clinging nor disowning, knowing what we hear and what we say, we build professional presence, confidence, and skill. Working our art, and artfully telling of our work, we create a body of applied literature, relevant to persons, groups, communities—told in words, filled with images.

## Image

Steiner (1991) writes that the "Freudian mapping of the...psyche..., Freudian interpretation and the resulting therapy, depend wholly on the Hebraic-Hellenic postulate and legacy

of discourse and of text" (p. 107). To this, our school adds a body-rooted, mythopoeic, Egyptian, alchemical sensibility, which relies on image as much as word, honors imagination as a reach beyond being toward becoming. The Egyptologist Steven Quirke (1992) comments:

*The language in which we speak of the world will never be contained in math formulas nor contained in words—so long as there is content that cannot be expressed in univalent form. At every stage of consciousness language will turn to images as an adequate descriptive medium. (p. 258)*

For Jung (1997) images are instinct's perceptions of itself, and "instinct is the dynamic side of the images" (p. 684). For physicist David Bohm (1988) images are "a key bridge between the older emotional brain and the more intellectual neocortex" (p. 26). As it retranscribes events and reconfigures outer phenomena, psyche makes instinct and emotion manifest in images. Both as carriers of content and as metaphor, images come from and link diverse parts of soma and mind, and demonstrate their interaction.

If dance is body speaking, and word is mind dancing, image is psyche's embrace of both. Because grounded in body, mind can interact with matter to produce art. Because kin of the phenomenal, mind structures science and invents technology. It reveals itself in the holographic representations of hieroglyph and calligraphy, gives expression to William James' varieties of experience, speaks in Flournoy's imaginary languages and mixes it up the alchemical retorts of the arts.

It was his relation to image—its unfolding in myth, religion, ritual, cere-

mony, practice and experiment—that drew Jung to the study of many civilizations and impelled him to visit other cultures and continents. It is specifically our relation to image that allows analytical psychologists around the world to cross class lines and national borders to engage with women, men, and children from different settings and contexts. It also gives us entry into the processional world of film and computer art.

An analytic hour is filled with images as well as words. It is arduous, after a session, to recount how instincts and images, emotions and projections, mythos and logos translate into the other. It is an ordeal to describe the interplay in any given session, between transference and relationship, and among affect energy and symbol.

My colleague Maurice Krasnow reminds me of the last picture of the *Mutus Liber*, a wordless series of alchemical images. In it, a boy and girl hold their fingers to their lips, as if the images say all, as if no words could tell the secret in the art. Yet we are not silent alchemists but accountable mental health professionals. While we honor confidentiality, and suffer that no analytic process can be fully described, our efforts are not hidden and occult.

The need to guard patients' privacy and analysts' anonymity may keep us reticent. Or is it wonder and awe? Or exhaustion and shyness? Or doubt and shame which renders us mute.

Psyche will have its say anyway. If we surrender the formal telling, our collegial chats becomes leaky, and clinical vignettes become professional gossip. Or our conversation becomes commerce, an exchange severed from its source.

When we transmit that mythopoetic language which crosses the thresholds

of unconscious and conscious to emerge through the ground of analytic exchange, we convey the intensity of psyche, of instinct and emotion. When we display the interactive complexity of psychic imagery, we confirm how psyche configures reality.

### **The Larger Context**

Can Jungian practice remain an applied depth psychology if we do not tell it from the "inside"? Can we have a viable voice, and make a vital contribution to the life of mind and psyche, without a recognizable, professional tongue? Many of us think not. If we cannot transmit the relevance of our theories and the efficacy of our perspective, what we have to offer will not be heard, nor made available to those who would benefit.

But—many of us agree—if we define ourselves only or primarily in relation to the psychoanalyses, if we over-accommodate, we displace ourselves from the larger *pre- and post-*Jungian conversation, which stems from many sources and follows diverse vectors. If Jung had been contained within psychoanalysis, he might not have heard Einstein, written for Wilhelm, written to White, and with Kerényi. He would not have pushed against the margins described by William James, and we would not have his provocative correspondence with Pauli, recently published. Our references would be confined, and our analogies constricted.

Jung thought psychology lacks essential *gravitas* if not resonant with past intuitions, and equally lacking if not attuned to present and future premise, if not translated into contemporary scientific language. His thesis

that intuitive imagery is a prescientific apperception of the workings of the world is having striking confirmation. Compare, for instance, big-bang theory with early creation myths. Compare Robert Fludd's depictions of the alchemical *unus mundus* and modern diagrams of physics' super-string theory in its 16-or some speculate 26-dimensions. If we take the time to acquaint ourselves with the current paradigms, we become more assured of the relevance and aliveness of his models.

Among the many current examples of correspondence between Jungian postulates, current science, and post-modern perception, the biologist Edmund Wilson (1998) posits archetypal patterns in biology and the unity of knowledge he calls "consilience." In the making of minds, Jung saw collective patterns for conceptualizing human experience, structuring those "phenomenological contents of the mind" that exhibit certain *apparently* lawful patterns. The complexity theorist and Nobel physicist Murray Gell-Mann (1995) perceives in the making of matter numerous regularities resulting from "frozen accidents," those chance events whose "long-term consequences . . . may take on the character of a law, at any but the most fundamental level" (p. 134). In my experience at ecumenical conferences, such analogies provide a background for common reference.

Near the end of his life, Jung (1970) saw psyche as "to a large extent dependent on" (p. xix) the structures of the brain and the fate of analytical psychology especially reliant on neuroscience. Our paradigm is of psyche as an emotive and imaginal process among "all kinds of opposites," as an interactive multiplicity beyond

dualisms of mind-body, conscious-unconscious, brain and psyche. It stands up well. Hear these parallels.

After he immersed himself in alchemy, Jung came to see the unconscious as a process. Nobel neuroscientist Gerald Edelman (1992) writes that "consciousness is a process, not a substance" and "mind is a process, not a stuff" (p. 6). Jung thought the notion of spirit must be continuously redefined, as matter is in physics. Edelman observes that "matter has been reconceived in terms of processes; mind has not been reconceived as a special form of matter. . . mind is a special kind of process depending on special arrangements of matter" (p.6).

Disagreeing with Descartes, Jung (1935) argued for the primacy of body-related emotion: "It is the doctor's duty to accept the emotions of the patient and to mirror them" (p. 139). Neuroscientists such as Joseph LeDoux (1996) and Antonio Damasio (1999) support the privileging of emotion in human response and in the making of what LeDoux has come to call "the synthetic mind" and Damasio terms "extended consciousness."

Jung saw psyche as the source and subject, goal and object of psyche. Steven Weinberg (1994), a Nobel laureate in particle physics, refers to "well known problems in the description of consciousness in terms of the working of the brain," which "arise because we each have special knowledge of our own consciousness that does not come to us from the senses" (p. 47). He adds:

*In principle, no obstacle stands in the way of explaining the behavior of other people in terms of neurology and physiology and ultimately, in terms of physics and history....we should find that part of the expla-*

*nation is a program of neural activity that we will recognize as corresponding to our own consciousness. (p. 48)*

His conclusion echoes Jung's:

*I keep encountering a stubborn duality in the role of intelligent life in the universe, as both subject and student....although opinions differ, it is hard to identify anything special that qualifies some process to be called a measurement except its effect on a conscious mind. (p. 48)*

Jung's notion of a collective predisposition toward internal, life-enhancing images is his most radical hypothesis. We have failed to transmit how his archetypal thesis functions as a psychic reality and a therapeutic tool. Striking confirmation is emerging from the work of Rodolfo Llinas (1997), a neuropsychiatrist and neurobiologist at New York University, and his colleagues. These researchers offer a neurological basis for an internal, image-creating process. They speak of "endogenesis," and describe how sensory experience is created not via incoming signals from the world, but by intrinsic, continuing processes of the brain. Here, the role of sensory input is to "trellis, shape, and otherwise sculpt"(p. 4) intrinsic neural activity to produce survival-enhancing representations. They claim that the central nervous system is a closed system whose basic organization is oriented toward generating intrinsic images. Sensory inputs specify internal states and modify activity in this closed system. Brains are self-activating and capable of generating cognitive representations in the absence of sensory input. Cognition is an intrinsic property of neural activity. Dreams provide the key piece of their evidence:

"Dreaming and wakefulness are similar from electro-physiological and neurological points of view." Indeed, turning the usual perception inside out, they suggest that wakefulness may be described as a dreamlike state modulated by sensory input" (p. 6).

Just as Jung pursued the notion of the self as a unifying principle, and physicists imagine a fundamental law of everything, so do these neuroscientists seek to know the binding mechanism by which the brain integrates its many perceptions into a usable apprehension of reality.

### **Moving on**

We have been in an era of preoccupation with Jung, of projections on the man and presumptions about his life. We mimic or argue as if his thought was static, rather than forms of argument as his thought evolved. Whether from intellectual inertia, or regressive constructs around loyalty, this keeps us from our cutting edges in current dialogue. If we eternally return to circle around Jung's more stadial concepts, we continuously re-leave the nineteenth century, from which he himself departed, and from which the launch into the twenty-first is difficult. When instead we carry on and carry forth, without denying from whence we originate, we are more original. Our language then has currency, and our practice has cogency.

The positing of a complex and dynamic psyche interacting with external reality encompasses both the mythic mind of the past and the multitasking brain of the present, and has appeal for the alchemical minds of the young and technologically literate. The computer artist Ellen Scott (2001) describes her

interactive computer-art installation *Harmonic*. She writes:

*Harmonic was inspired by a serendipitous encounter: driving down a highway watching a flock of birds soar and dive over a field while listening to jazz music. The structure (or lack thereof) of the birds' motion and the music seemed similar, almost conscious of each other; the experience was sublime. (p.1)*

Addressing her medium, and retort, she continues:

*Technology-based artwork, in fact, presents the opportunity to reveal this beauty in a new way-through its processes rather than-or in addition to-its content. More specifically, by emulating the patterns and procedures of nature-including randomness, recursion, and interdependence-technology can reveal their beauty. Furthermore, it is a medium perhaps more effective and transformative than its predecessors because it can represent these patterns as interactive processes. (pp. 7-8)*

She describes this art as we might describe the processional nature of a dream, and the interaction of the conscious and unconscious within a psyche: "Interactivity is the means by which an artwork can represent nature in a procedural manner, as opposed to content-based representation" (p. 8). As an artist-chemist, she speaks thus of this "opus":

*The question of "soul" is particularly relevant to the themes of Harmonic and to interactive art in general. In a piece of art, "soul" can be interpreted as the traditional "aura" of an original. As technology becomes more and more sophisticated, however, I believe that "soul" can be interpreted as the procedural consciousness of an interactive artwork. (p.14)*

## The Dynamic

Working from the conviction that while timeless and ever present, the operative archetype is to be translated into the scientific language of the present, Jung (1978) perceived of the self as a dynamic process. He compared it

*to the carbon-nitrogen cycle in the sun, when a carbon nucleus captures four protons....The carbon nucleus itself comes out of the reaction unchanged, "like the Phoenix from the ashes." The secret of existence, i.e., the existence of the atom and its components, may well consist in a continually repeated process of rejuvenation, and one comes to similar conclusions in trying to account for the numinosity of archetypes. (p. 260)*

Jung followed William James's mandate to push the margins toward increasingly dynamic edges which refuse reification. In a provocative 1952 letter, he suggested that psyche be seen as an "unextended intensity. . . gradually rising from minute extensity to infinite intensity, transcending . . . the velocity of light and thus irrealizing the body." The brain, he offers, "might be a transformer station," where the "intensity of the psyche" is "transformed into perceptible frequencies or 'extensions.'" He supposes "the fading of introspective perception of the body" may be "due to a gradual 'psychification,' i.e., intensification at the expense of extension." "Psyche," he concludes, "equals the highest intensity in the smallest space," but, he adds, "in itself the psyche would have no dimension in space and time at all" (Jung, 1975, p. 45).

Many here take such complexity further, to incorporate data from beyond Jung's time and place while

meeting the new with continued curiosity. Many teach analytical psychology in rooted words with dynamic valance; transcend sectarian limits without losing parameters; work at the margins without being marginal; allow the mystery without resorting to the magical; know the silence in the *tremendum*; are not mute in speaking the myriad ways of the experienced and ethical life. Many attempt to say how the conscience of consciousness mandates a moral engagement with our planet.

The polarizations of our planet were horribly concretized on September 11, 2001, when three thousand persons from 86 countries died in the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Washington. The conflicted beginnings of our millennium make acute what Jung and his contemporaries learned so painfully through the genocidal projections in World War II. To the same degree fundamentalism, literalism, and fanaticism are destructive, so are the goals and aims of psychic integration more precious. The psychic prohibitions against splitting, shadow projection, and the inflation of an imagined special axis to truth and transcendence are more crucial than ever.

Analytical psychology is seeded with the profound and wide concerns and aims which must be in play if the human race and its endeavors are to survive. If we have any access to how human consciousness may so contain the opposites that it need not claim righteousness, seek a scapegoat, organize around appetite or enmity, it would seem imperative that we find the words and means to add our understanding to the larger dialogue.

If analytical psychology endures as a dynamic perception, a profession, and perspective, may it be because of, not

despite, us. Because, in conversation among ourselves, in discourse with other colleagues, and in engagement with the telling issues of our time, we speak as expert witnesses and willing participants in the ongoing process of the human psyche. Because we stay with the questions and do not insist on or pretend the answers. Evoking psyche's language, imagistic and dynamic, timeless and immediate, with words which remember—and further—shall we each speak it as we hear it? Tell it as we see it? And as we are moved by it? Shall we continue the dance?

## Notes

- 1) This paper originated as a keynote address at the IAAP Congress, Cambridge, England, August, 2001.

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