

Response to the Responses by Mogenson, Miller, Beebe, and Pulver

Wolfgang Giegerich

Before I begin with my response I want to express my admiration and gratitude to the editor of this journal, Stanton Marlan, for his courage in putting normal journal conventions aside and, in the interest of intellectual needs and an in-depth exploration of a topic, devoting an entire issue to one over-long article and its extensive discussion by a number of eminent psychological thinkers. Beyond the fact that I happen to be the main beneficiary of his decision, I think this prioritizing of intellectual concerns is also to the benefit of the community of the readers of this journal and of the cause.

I will comment on the responses by my colleagues in the order that they came in.

I am very grateful to **Greg Mogenson** for providing, in his response, a masterful presentation of what I am *positively* reaching for in psychology, by supplying a background and complement to the more *critical* endeavors in my "End of Meaning" paper. In conjunction with a new, intelligent reading of *Moby Dick*, he gives an insightful exposition of, and introduction into, such difficult themes as the concept of logical negativity and the importance of "truth" for psychology, ideas central to what in my opinion psychology is about. Although this is what makes up the main body of his text, there is no need for further comment by me here on his successful exposition. What I will have to comment on are two peripheral aspects of his reply that I do not feel so comfortable with.

While I admit that the foil of the *Moby Dick* novel works, in Mogenson's deft hands, amazingly well in many, many aspects for representing what by way of abbreviation we might call the "hunt for the Notion," I nevertheless wonder whether this story might not also be a bit misleading because it comes loaded with the wrong feeling-tones. Does it not evoke too heroic a pathos, come inflated with a too lofty sense of importance to be able to provide the adequate tone and spirit for discussing my psychology project? This project is so much more simple, quiet, sober, unpretentious. It is not only that with the Melville story we are focusing on the biggest animals of all, whales, but on top of it on this one special, indeed singular whale, *Moby Dick*! Is in this way not the very idea that I criticized in my essay somehow conjured up again: Jung's idea of that precious ONE thing in comparison with which everything else is *maya* or, to use Mogenson's imagery, mere guppies?

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The whale image might support the possible misunderstanding that the psychological effort is directed at big and spectacular *objects*, objects of supreme, even absolute, importance. But it is not (what an unpsychological concept the popular idea of “object relations” is!). All it wants is to get, in each case, to the Mercurius/the logic/the Notion/the soul in the phenomenon at hand as its prime matter, usually a quite ordinary (*maya*) phenomenon. The image of Ahab hunting down Moby Dick might be surreptitiously experienced as an authorization of the myth-and-meaning addiction so widespread in Jungianism. To get to “the soul” (the Notion) does not require a highly emotional, obsessive chase. It is a very calm, almost methodical process. Also, it is not like Ahab’s a willful unidirectional forward motion; it is just as *recursive* as it is constructive, as *passive* (something that happens to one) as it is active. Similarly, “absolute-negative interiorization” should not be imagined in terms of a dramatic and violent death and literal catastrophe (Ahab’s drowning). It is more like an alchemical fermenting corruption (from within).

The second point of discomfort for me comes at the very end of Mogenson’s paper: his heroic attempt to impute to Jung a “dialectical contribution to the soul’s logical life.” I am not convinced. The very statement to which Mogenson wants to give a dialectical reading seems to me to display Jung’s undialectical stance: “No, evidently we no longer have any myth. . . . But what then is your myth?” The “But” says all: Jung proceeds with an objection to (rejection of) his negative insight, which is really *his* insight, *his* prima materia, rather than waiting to see how this negative insight might unfold *its* own internal contradictions and what it might give birth to. The open question that the second sentence raises shows that nothing, no “Moby Dick,” has as yet shown itself to Jung of its own accord (from out of the negative insight itself), but that Jung, as ego personality, instead dictates a priori the general nature or form that that which he *wants* to find is supposed to take: the form of myth. This is a dogmatic prejudgment. Jung here disrupts the self-movement of the Notion (and thereby blocks any possible further movement) by opposing to his own “objective” experience his “subjective” counter-program.

Thus since he did not stay with, and let himself be initiated by, his “we no longer have any myth,” it also follows that Jung did not land himself “really out there, without external foundations, in the infinite bottomless sea.” On the level of *theory*, Jung generally refused dialectics in favor of “neurotic” dissociation (visualized in the “Küsnacht”–“Bollingen” split), of a thoroughly undialectical thinking in terms of *opposites*, even *collision* (cf. his idea of a collision of duties). He insisted on the “barrier through the mental world” and on turning back when one got to it (rather than crossing the border and thereby entering infinity, absolute negativity). He of course *had* to refuse dialectics—or else he would have had to *think*, which he felt was absolutely taboo for him. He believed instead that what was exclusively allowed was to merely observe empirical facts; he felt that he needed to stay on solid ground.

The infinite negativity of “the bottomless sea” *today* consists in that “whales”—to spin the Moby Dick metaphor further—have become extinct altogether; only the sea (the medium, the syntax) is left. There is no “Moby Dick” to be hunted anymore, no semantic content capable of providing mythic meaning. That had been the very point of Jung’s own “No, evidently we no longer have any myth,” which, however, *he* used only as the “wall at which the interest rebounds.”

As we have seen, “to ‘no longer have any myth’ is,” according to Mogenson, “to be really out there, without external foundations, in the infinite bottomless sea.” Repeating Jung’s fallacious move (from “no myth anymore” to “*But* what is your myth?”) once more, fully “going with Giegerich,” *but* trying to defend Jung “against Giegerich,” his statement locates the change out there, on the side of the object or substance: Jung has been thrust into a new external situation (bottomless sea, with no Archemidean point), which is in itself to be seen as the ideal precondition for a hoped-for epiphany of a new numinous content, a new myth = Moby Dick.

As Mogenson’s whole text demonstrates, he actually knows better, he knows that what is at stake is not on the side of the object out there, but on that of subjectivity. Yet seduced by the tendency inherent in the imagery of his chosen model (Ahab and Moby Dick) as well as by his own wish to rescue the idea of a *higher* destination of analytical psychology, he does not expressly make corrections for the systematic fault lying in the imagistic formulation of his statement. Lest the reader be misled by the “objectivist” pull of this formulation, I want to point out—availing myself of the important distinction David Miller makes in his response—that the quoted sentence seems to “read (the loss of myth) materially,” while we should “read (it) formally.” The loss of myth does by no means imply the loss of external foundations and the consequent dramatic exposure to the equally external bottomless element and the adventurous encounter with the wholly Other emerging from it. No, *this* is precisely not the difference that the loss of myth makes. Before and after, it is the same world, as well-grounded *and* as bottomless as it is all the time. All that has changed is the logic of the situation and thus (objectively) the status that things are in and (subjectively) the specific significance that they have for us.

So instead of a semantic, horizontal *transportation*, on one and the same level, from a foundation to the infinite bottomless sea (both “out there”), we should understand the change “vertically” as the inner, “alchemical” *transformation* of the logical constitution of the same world/consciousness from one level or status to another: as “the birth of man,” that is to say, as his having simply *outgrown* the waiting for Godot or the Great Whale, his having been cured of the need for big numinous experiences. Meaning (capitalized) is no topic anymore. It has lost all interest, like a dummy or pacifier has for children who have outgrown the baby phase. No Great Expectations, rather the humility, simplicity of trying to do a fairly decent job of living life on this earth in an intelligent and soulful way. That is all.

The horizontal move amounts to a splitting of “foundation” here and “bottomlessness” there as a real, “semantic,” “objective” difference. And by putting consciousness on the outlook for the Great Whale, the spectacular meaning-laden content, it holds consciousness down in the mental-picturing mode (*Vorstellen*) when it would actually need to be taught to *think*: to simply comprehend more deeply what is already there and has been there all the time. This, the move from *Vorstellen* to thought, from Miller’s “material” to “formal reading,” is the change brought about by “the loss of myth.”

However, in this new, very low-key situation, the idea of what has been imaged as the infinite bottomless sea without external foundations (“no Archemidean point outside psychology”) has by no means become unimportant. In this I agree with Mogenson. *But* (and here I come to the small, but decisive difference between our views) it is now—logically, “formally”—no more than one

methodological standpoint that one can take at times as the *professional* mode of psychology besides all sorts of other standpoints, which one might take alternatively or at times just as well, such as, to mention only three examples, the scientific-technological one (Heidegger's *rechnendes Denken*), the sentimental-holistic one, and the humanistic one. It is not—semantically, existentially, experientially, metaphysically—the new real situation of modern man at large into which the loss of myth has inevitably thrown him; and for this reason it does not lend itself to a support of the weighty question of or hope for mythic meaning. Doing psychology is just one of those things that one can do, if one is so minded; it is a *praxis*, not a *theôria* or *epistêmê* (although its particular *praxis*, I have to add, is the highest form of *praxis*: that of “theoricieren” [Paracelsus]). Doing psychology does not answer big metaphysical questions and longings.

Seen in this light and particularly in the light of the catastrophic ending of *Moby Dick* and of a narration from the point of view of a sole survivor, one could even get the idea that this story might serve, better than as an illustration of an absolute-negative interiorization, as a depiction of the futility and obsolescence of the Jungian program of a *quest for meaning*. Does not perhaps the novel portray this quest only for the purpose of *objectively* reducing it to absurdity *at the end and through* this end? Does it not dismiss such a quest poetically, detach consciousness from it? Also, can it not be seen as the *self-display* of the fact that such a quest, at this time in history, amounts to a submersion in the water (cf. Jung's sacrifice of the intellect), when actually the emergence from the waters (“Aquarius”) is what the times demanded?

Mogenson states, “Strictly considered, Jung's *Moby Dick* is not some guppy of an antiquated symbol or myth, but *sublated* symbol, *sublated* myth: analytical psychology.” Here I would answer: There is a difference between sublated myth (which as sublated will no longer be myth) and pseudo-myth (the *program* or ideology of mythic meaning). To be more precise, we have to make the following distinctions. We have to differentiate between:

- sublated *myth* and *symbols*, which could indeed be imaged as “guppies in the aquarium” (sunken former cultural *truths* as nice-to-look-at dream images and similar spontaneous imaginal experiences of consciousness in [inside] the modern individual, all of only strictly private, personal significance notwithstanding their possible “archetypal” content and feeling-tone);
- *sublated* myth, which, now a thing of the bygone past, was Western metaphysics and Christian theology, which in turn, as long as they were alive, used to be of public, cultural importance and the general truth *in which* the individuals, their thought, and life experience were “embedded”;
- *sublated* metaphysics and Christian theology, which *is* the modern (to a large extent “positivistic” and “nihilistic”) world, the world of, first, *industrial* and, now, *medial* modernity; the latter (medial modernity, since around 1970) is what some today call “postmodern.” In it whales are, by the way, even literally threatened by extinction, subjected, as they are, to reckless overfishing; and it is a world that no longer needs and craves Meaning, the mythic for it serving merely the purpose of

show, entertainment (*Star Wars*, *E.T.*, *The Lord of the Rings* movies) or that of advertising, i.e., of the open demonstration of its obsolescence and its continued and ever deeper absorption into consumerism.

In contrast to these three authentic possibilities there is also the phony possibility of

- *simulated* or *pseudo-myth* as a modern substitute compensating for a feeling of lack or as the itself empty objectification of one's subjective insistence on "meaning," one's *program* of a "symbolic life." In the depth-psychological version of this possibility (there are also other, political, religious, worldview versions as well: ideologies), this would be any "guppy in the aquarium" *inflated* to the status of Moby Dick in the ocean.

While Mogenson's "archetype" may well be "un-nostalgic and future-oriented" and "negativized into itself, against even its own historical contents and archaic origins," I think he has not demonstrated that Jung's "archetype" was not regressive, Jung's mythic meaning not simulated; what made Jung's "archetypes" nostalgic was his need to see them as *present realities* (as the presence of Meaning) and thus to use, abuse them for *existential wants* (his, our wants) instead of letting them be (releasing them into being) historical presences and merely using them, as it were, "archeologically" for gaining insight into former states in the history of the soul. And to answer Mogenson's specific question to me about Queequeg, I would say that from the one single image of the pre-19th-century Queequeg and the 19th-century Ishmael twined together in Melville's novel, I cannot conclude that the rupture I discussed in my article "was part of a dialectical action culminating in its own sublation." Can this image of the two be considered a true image of the "unity of their unity and their difference"? Does it not itself betray that this unity is an artifice and not the self-unfolding of the Notion's internal logic: two fundamentally separate and different beings externally (additively) stuck together, but not alchemically or logically united? It is clear that what Mogenson sees in it is indeed *meant* (intended) by this image; but it is equally clear that the image does not succeed in *in fact* expressing the idea that it is supposed to mean. At the time of Melville, after the great divide, it obviously was no longer possible to really think the thought of the "unity of their unity and their difference" and thus it was naturally also no longer possible to in fact bring this contradictory unity about poetically: the difference has now gained the upper hand.

The question I ask is: Do we not have to go all the way—to the bitter end—with our realization of the fundamental (i.e., irreparable) flaw of Jung's psychological project so that the situation thus reached can unfold *its* dialectic (rather than that we try to give Jung a dialectical or, as others are trying, "postmodern" reading [= *face-lifting*], after the fact)? "Sooner or later the account will have to be settled after all," Jung himself realized (GW 9/I, § 44, my translation). Can there be a future *before* the bills from the past have been paid by us, paid down to the last farthing?

It is with deep satisfaction and gratitude that I receive such a learned, insightful, and elegant response to my essay as the one from **David Miller** is. He responds on the basis of a very diligent, thoroughgoing study of it and, well-read as he is, manages to place it convincingly into the wider intellectual context of recent thought. A special and naturally very welcome surprise to me is the degree of his solid familiarity with previous publications of mine dating as far back as the mid-70s (which for me have long disappeared in the "well of the past") and his thus being able to read the new essay in their light, establishing connections that are illuminating for me. Generously he avoids "quibbles" and focuses on one crucial issue. His points are not only important but also well argued. I see in his discussion not so much a critique as a subtle attempt to give my theses a very gentle but nevertheless decisive twist into a direction that I feel is, however, no longer exactly mine, notwithstanding our basic agreement. Yes, "[p]sychology, i.e., consciousness, is at stake." Yes, we have to move from "ego-ology" to "psych-ology." And yet I resist Miller's slight shift of emphasis. There are mainly three areas I would like to comment on: 1) the issue of the contrast between "material" and "formal," 2) the idea of the sublation of history, and 3) the interpretation of that which differs as "simply different." I can only hope that the following comments will not be viewed as "semantic quibbles" and, of course, that I did not misconstrue what Miller is driving at.

1) A certain paragraph of my essay, Miller states, "points not to material history but to formal thinking about any nature or history," and at the end of his response he warns against reading my essay "materially rather than formally." In my answer to Mogenson, I referred to and used this distinction in a connection that showed how crucial Miller's warning is.

However I think that Miller's formulation might be open to misunderstandings. It could be understood as a simple undialectical splitting of material history and one's formal thinking about it (which is certainly not meant). This I think would not work. For is not one's thinking *formally* about history a thinking about material history (history read *materially*), and is not material history, i.e., the material of one's formal thinking, always, albeit only implicitly, somehow already apperceived (thought, interpreted) formally? In other words, is not on both sides of this distinction the same, namely both matter *and* form at once? Is the Mercurius not *in* the matter? Can we become conscious *detached from* an attempt at responsibly accounting for "the way things actually were or how they now really are"? Would this not be an uprooted consciousness, one that voluntarily ignores certain aspects of our reality? Any "formal thinking about any nature or history" must, I think, be committed to the question of how things really were and are, or else it turns into a kind of free association, free fantasizing.

Thus "formal thinking," understood properly, does not refer to theories *inside our minds* about material history *outside*. What is meant here is much rather our comprehending the real ("material") historical change as an "alchemical" transformation of the logical constitution of consciousness and the world (the same world as ever), and not the external transportation from one external ("material," semantic, empirical-factual) situation to another. It is essentially the move beyond mental picturing (*Vorstellen*) to thought. The picturing mode inevitably substantiates the change; it imagines it, figuratively speaking, in terms of "physics" (as a physical change, such as locomotion), rather than in terms of

"alchemy" (as one and the same prime matter's move through its states from "solid" to "gaseous"). This change is thus not just in our subjective minds, it is just as much (or even more so) out there, objectively invested (embodied) in the organization of society, the structure of public thought, the form of economic life, the scientific knowledge of the world: as their new, real logic. In fact, it is predominantly the new logical constitution of our present-day *reality* that can and must initiate our subjective minds, which mostly still cling to the old (picturing) mode of thinking, into the adequate "formal" thinking about our reality.

2) Yes, the important thing is "logical transformation." But the way I see it this transformation of consciousness brings a change to both sides (subject and object) at once and thus does not do away with the one side in the sense of a sublation of history (Miller speaks of "a sublation not only of nature but also of history"). To the extent that the form in which material history was implicitly (unconsciously) thought by us at first *comes home* to our consciousness and now explicitly informs our formal thinking, our thinking has at once received a "new" material history to think formally about, i.e., the same material history *as* a newly perceived one. I do not see how "human embeddedness in history" could be "over," how history could actually be sublated today. For me the (full) sublation of nature means conversely the *birth* of history, and what is sublated through the necessary logical transformation is not material history as such and our embeddedness in it, but only one specific form in which material history had initially appeared to consciousness. Not a wholesale end ("end of history"), but a *determinate* negation.

Miller mentions the book *Erring: A Postmodern A/theology*, by Mark C. Taylor, and cites from it the phrase "end of history." The difficulty I have with the fantasy of an end of history may be due to there being two different concepts of history equivocally at work here. The one concept emerges when Miller speaks, with Taylor, about the tendency of historical consciousness toward "emplotment along the narrative line of beginning-middle-end" or when he states that with the rise of radical monotheism, there occurred a "displacement of so-called 'meaning' from the aegis of nature to that of history." This is not the same sense of history as when I speak of "historical loci" etc., nor when theologians wrestle with the problem of the historical Jesus nor when Sonu Shamdasani tries to unravel the historical threads that entered into Jung's psychology.

I would claim that the rise of monotheism did not really amount to a shift from nature to history, or only superficially did so. Radical monotheism was only *the first immediacy* of an overcoming of nature as a place of meaning, not the full-fledged overcoming of nature. At least as far as Christianity is concerned, the new place of meaning is not history, but *heilsgeschichte*, which is (sublated) *myth* (= one single super-"myth," i.e., "theology": the very "emplotment along the narrative line of beginning-middle-end" that Taylor speaks of). What really happened with the rise of monotheism is the (first immediacy of a) sublation of nature in the sense of a logical move, *still within the sphere of nature*, from the Particular to the Universal: from trees, mountains, rivers (in the status of eachness) to the totality of nature: the creation, fall, and redemption of the *world*. Polytheism did precisely not have a notion of an *anima MUNDI* as yet, since the conscious awareness of the "mundus" requires either the "monotheistic" or the philosophical rise high above the level of the particulars of nature. The sphere of history proper had not been entered, a his-

torical consciousness not yet emerged. *It* began to surface, after earlier beginnings in Greek and Latin antiquity, only during the 18th century when, and to the extent that, *heilsgeschichte* (the Christian version of meaning = embeddedness in the natural world created and to be redeemed by God) lost its hold over consciousness. Now man could no longer reflect his existence in terms of particular natural divine forces (polytheism, myth) nor in terms of God's universal salvation scheme for the world (theology, *heilsgeschichte*, faith). Only now did he have to and was he able to comprehend himself in terms of a new, namely *reflected*, Particular (instead of the previous *sensate*, immediate Particular), which is the result of the sublation of the previous Universal: his concrete earthly-empirical history (1. the political, economic, social, ideological history that brought about the specific situation of his time, 2. the biographical history responsible for his personal condition, 3. biological history ["evolution"] to which he owed his existence as a member of the human race). And only now, with this modern entrance of consciousness into concrete human history and truly diachronic thinking, had nature been fully sublated.

The "end of 'endism'" and the sublation or end of "history" ("history" as *heilsgeschichte*): yes indeed. But this is the sublation of the *first immediacy* of the sublation of *nature*, not the sublation of "historical consciousness." As to "human embeddedness in history": is Taylor not also a child of his time? His views are not just produced by him as the particular individual that he is; his historical locus is a powerful co-author that makes him think the way he does. Could we imagine that if he had been born a hundred years earlier, he would also have proclaimed the metaphysical dogma (or should we say "phantasm") of the "primordially of lack"? Of course not. Or that if he would be born a hundred years from now, he would still come up with this idea? With the same kind of certainty with which we can assume that tomorrow the sun will rise again, we can assume that a hundred years from now history will have gone beyond this recent fascination with "lack." And does Taylor not himself admit of his embeddedness in history and his indebtedness to his historical locus by explicitly including the word "postmodern" in the title of his book? (Where, by the way, "postmodern" is a word that blatantly operates with the fantasy of "ending.") The task in this regard for psychology is, to my mind, to make us aware of, and teach us to see through to, our unconscious containment in our concrete historical situation and how the logic of this situation informs us; to teach us to comprehend, in formal thinking, this situation materially in its *Gewordensein* (how it came to be), and—not to forget!—to distinguish ourselves from it (so as not to have to simply act it out unconsciously).

3) I think a good case can be made for diachrony, without, however, our having to imagine history therefore as "a series of now-points moving in a linear . . . manner." A thinking in terms of now-points would precisely be a depleted, merely abstract-formal thinking about history. No, we can start at the other end, with concrete, determinate ("materially" satiated) historical situations and conceive of them quasi-alchemically as phases or stages that the "prime matter" goes through in the course of its process. The moment one looks at concrete historical phenomena it makes very much sense to think in terms of development, e.g., the development of Jung's thought, the development of the plough, the history of "meaning," and also to distinguish between more primitive and more developed forms of ploughs, for example.

I sense in Miller a tendency to get away from a diachronic view of history and from hierarchical stages of development. Instead, he seems to aim for a placement of phenomena side by side as “simply different.” From the relatively few comments he makes on this I conclude that at least two problems stand for him in the way of thinking in terms of “stages”: the fear of value judgments and his understanding of development as “causal” development. However, my sense of historical development is not vulnerable to either objection.

While admitting that there indeed are phenomena that are “simply different,” I insist that this category does not do justice to all phenomena. As Hegel has shown, items that are “simply different” (*verschieden*) are indifferent to the difference between them. If one took the position of *Verschiedenheit* and carried it to its utmost logical conclusion (which I of course do not impute to Miller), one would ultimately end up with “anything goes.” But there *are* phenomena that are different in such a way that they are not indifferent to the difference between them. This is, to use only one example, the case with polytheism and monotheism. Monotheism demands, “Thou shalt have no other gods before me” (Exod. 20:3). In other words, *within itself* it negates, and pushes off from, its other, polytheism. It *is* this having pushed itself off. Because it thus presupposes and contains within itself its other as something whose overcoming it is, and because it thus *makes its own mediation explicit*, it is superior to polytheism, much as a content that is “remembered” (*er-innert*, interiorized, integrated) is psychologically superior to the same content merely projected or acted out.

This ranking is not something *we* do subjectively to the phenomena on the basis of certain of their external features, like the rating of a jury in a beauty contest where all the competing beauties are indeed simply different and parade on the same level. Rather, the phenomena themselves make this difference between them. Monotheism has *mastered* the truth of its predecessor (polytheism): has mastered, and ipso facto left, the *level* of the Particular, and thus now apperceives and thinks the Universal (that it in turn has not yet mastered, hypostatizing it as something wholly transcendent, which is why monotheism is only the first immediacy of a sublation of polytheism/nature). Polytheism, at any rate, does not master and become conscious of its own truth, but is forced to experience and think in terms of Particulars, being incapable of conceiving of the Universal. If it had been able to conceive of the Universal it would ipso facto have ceased being polytheism (thus also ceased to be able to truly *see the gods* in trees, rivers, mountains)—which was a fate that befell, e.g., the Pharaoh Amenophis IV (Ikhnaton).

But calling polytheism “more primitive” and monotheism “higher” must not be confused with a value judgment nor any partisanship. There are two aspects of this. First, such description does not imply the claim that the one is (morally or in any other way) “better” than the other, just as by calling one type of school “elementary school” and another “high school” one does not denounce the one and morally privilege the other. Both are equally important and valuable, but they *are* also “elementary” and “high.” To those who find that words like “primitive” or “elementary” and “higher” or “superior” necessarily hurt feelings, I can only say: *Honi soi qui mal y pense*. It is *their* problem; *they* do not free themselves from their subjectivist judgmental and emotionalizing orientation (“the ego”) and believe that their merely refraining from any acting out of the category of inequality

might already pass for their having overcome the egoic *structure of consciousness* as such; thus they do not advance from the position of external reflection to the standpoint of soul (and of thought), to an interest in soberly, matter-of-fact-like comprehending and acknowledging the internal differences that the phenomena themselves make within themselves.

Second, the fact that monotheism is higher does not mean that *adherents* of monotheism are in any sense "higher." It is well possible that a particular adherent of a polytheistic religion was morally higher, more intelligent, culturally more refined than a particular adherent of monotheism. People are always just human, all-too-human and cannot ascribe to themselves personally the possible superiority of the historical formation of the mind that they find themselves in. How people specifically are remains to be seen in each case. But this is of no concern here, since psychology is not about people (nor about value judgments and moralizing in the first place) but about the products and statuses of the mind as well as about the spirit stirring within them and bringing about their self-movement.

Now I come to the other obstacle. If we stay with our one example, polytheism and monotheism, we can see that the mind's self-movement must not be conceived as a *causal* development, but as a development that proceeds via a free, new, unforeseeable *response* to its predecessor from out of a new historical locus, much as, e.g., Spinoza and Leibniz are responses to, and not causal effects of, Descartes, but also a true *further* development (and not merely simply different views alongside Descartes) inasmuch as they opened up new levels of "methodical reflection" still inaccessible to Descartes' own methodical reflection at *his* historical locus.

The psychological problem that I see with setting up cultural phenomena (e.g., polytheism and monotheism) as, to be sure, maybe more or less complex, yet nevertheless only simply different is that it would ipso facto reduce them logically to "dead" *objects* of consciousness and ourselves to external observers of them as they parade before us. But inasmuch as psychology is the discipline of interiority, the psychological job is to describe, not different qualities and different degrees of complexity that *we* can establish from outside (external reflection, "ego"), but rather those differences that the *phenomena* within themselves establish ("objectively") between them, because only then are we *inside* them and occupied with their soul (*their* internal logical life), comprehending them as "language" rather than as objects, as statements and responses to statements.

From the time when I was still in my Jungian training, I have felt that it is not enough that analysts need to undergo personal analysis before they subject patients to analysis, but that also "The Third of the Two," i.e., psychological *theory* (as the framework for all work in the consulting room), needs a similar critical self-reflection. So it is with great pleasure to note that **John Beebe** in his response brings out and does full justice to the motivation and spirit of my critique of Jung in my present essay. I feel completely understood when he recognizes in my paper "not an argument with the soul, but an argument from the soul," and when he appreciates my critique of Jung's psychology as one that does not come from outside but unfolds the latter's internal contradictions (cf. his quote from Stojanow).

My purpose is of course not to put Jung down but to advance our insight into the inner logic and origin of the tradition of thought to which we belong. And when Beebe makes this wonderful statement, "I like to feel that nothing would have delighted Jung more than to know that his psychology was to be dreamed forward, until the moment when he was not needed, and that awareness had replaced him," Beebe not only ascribes—and I would think rightly so—a noble spirit to Jung, but also displays his own noble thinking and psychological wisdom. Indeed: what is at stake is awareness, not the person.

Beebe's warning against jumping to the conclusion, on the basis of my paper, "that the practice of Jungian analysis has lost its *raison d'être* and can only henceforth be an anachronism" is as justified as his wondering "how much of Jung's thinking Giegerich himself would prefer his readers to retain." Although I do not wish to express any preferences concerning my reader's intellectual choices, a few comments on what I for myself want, or need, to retain may be in place. I had deliberately excluded from my article a discussion of Jung's lasting achievements. First of all, its purpose had not been a balanced assessment of Jung's psychology project as a whole, but solely a discussion of his psychology "in the light of the question of meaning." Secondly, including a discussion of Jung's positive achievements might have supported the erroneous idea that a critique is something so terrible that it would require immediate consolation. But in the world of the mind (in contrast to the narcissism of the ego personality), critique is in itself constructive. Thirdly, it might have created the impression that I was not willing to bear the full brunt of my being the unrelenting critic of this one aspect of Jung's psychology that I am, and wanted to show that I am a "nice" Jungian after all. Criticism and praise must not be offset against one another, because then each would neutralize the other, rather than coexisting each in its own right and with its full force.

What remains for me from among Jung's achievements (apart from the multitude of his truly marvelous psychological insights and intuitions about individual phenomena) is above all (1) that he had, and based his psychology on, a clear notion of *soul* as a *reality* in its own right (in contrast to the idea of "the psyche of the human being"), (2) that he knew that psychology had to be interested in contents, in substance, not merely in formal mechanisms and relations, (3) that he realized that "without history there can be no psychology" and that with his understanding of the archetypal depth of symbols he paved the way for an archeology of the soul, (4) that in the individual and in the consulting room only a minor aspect of the full reality of the soul can be seen and that a personal neurosis is more than a problem of that particular person, and (5) that his thought and his work as therapist were informed by a real sense of, and were committed to, the Singular (the *individuum ineffabile*), both with respect to persons and to each moment (in contrast to the usual abstractions of "cases," "case histories," "clinical diagnoses," "techniques to be applied," etc.). What all these—absolutely remarkable and, in his time, singular—points involve would require lengthy discussion. Since Beebe particularly mentioned "the practice of Jungian analysis," I merely want to state here that precisely when freed of the heavy burden of having to find "meaning" (which is *ultimately* the burden of "rescuing the world"), the work with individual patients can be deeply rewarding and exciting and with some luck get to a point where the patient can begin to lead a meaningful personal life.

Beebe's analysis of the relation of Jung and Hegel in terms of extraverted-introverted thinking function/intuitive function is certainly instructive. But I am particularly happy that he also goes beyond these typological categories by reminding the reader that for me thinking is not a *function* of consciousness (in the sense of Jung's typology). The danger of the application of the Jungian typological attitudes and functions to (psychological, theological, philosophical, etc.) arguments is that it tends to place each discussant on his or her separate planet, as it were, so that instead of a *meeting* (possibly clashing) of minds we get separate views encapsulated within themselves and unable to ever get into each other's hair.

Just as an aside I would like to mention here that in the clause "Jung, though developing in his essay on the transcendent function something that looks very much like Hegel's dialectic," the words "looks . . . like" should be taken as referring to "mere appearance" in the sense of illusion. Beebe may have made this comment with an article published by a Jungian a few years ago in the back of his mind, an article that claimed to demonstrate that Jung's "transcendent function" and Hegel's (as it was called) "dialectical model" (!) were indeed parallel, but in fact demonstrated a lack of understanding of Hegelian thinking. To be sure, the mechanical scheme of thesis-antithesis-synthesis is an oft-repeated cliché, but it is *not* Hegel, who instead thinks in terms of "mediation" and "sublation" (*Vermittlung* and *Aufhebung*).

It makes me particularly happy that Beebe is aware, and makes aware, of the "confidence [he senses in the thought of my paper] in the process of thought undoing the moments of itself that would prevent psychological thinking." One might say that this is the confidence of the "alchemist" in me.

But alas! As an observer of what is going on today, I must now admit that this confidence of mine is a confidence against despair. Does thought still have a chance in analytical psychology at all? Is thought, is the mind, still the *soul* of analytical psychology, or has our field (which, no doubt, is in the business of selling "soul") rather lost its own soul—"squandered [its] psychological birthright"? Certainly not everyone in psychology has to be a serious thinker. One can be a good practitioner without being an intellectual. But what does it mean for a *field* if it does not value the intellect and consider it a foremost concern to bring forth a new generation of intellectuals? How long can it hold out *as a field* before it goes to the dogs if it is depleted of intellectuals?

And has analytical psychology not indeed sold out to the marketplace, to popularity? Has it not come down to being no more than a service provider, a provider of health services, on the one hand, and of the gratification of emotional and "spiritual" needs (the needs of the ego), on the other? If one looks at what is published by Jungians at large and taught at Jungian training institutes, one is impressed by the syncretistic mishmash of ideas and techniques stemming from all sorts of heterogeneous sources. Almost anything seems to go. And anybody who has a license as an analyst feels entitled to voice opinions, free-association-like. Where is the field's inner authority that would give it its measure and identity, an authority that would be the equivalent of what in an individual's moral life is called conscience? It seems that there are only three authorities today ruling in and over the field of analytical psychology, all of which are false ones. There is within the field of analytical psychology the authority of Jung and what he taught (the dogmatic concept of authority), there is the authority of "what sells" (what

sells both on the market and in or for the individual Jungian personally), and then there is from outside the bureaucratic authority of legal regulations and the regulations of the professional societies, the authority of mechanical “quality management” requirements, of mindless evaluation schemes, of peer reviews, of ethics committees, and the like. This third form of authority is not restricted to psychology; on the contrary, its spread is a powerful, even overwhelming, trend in society at large, a trend that aims at the systematic undermining of *personal intellectual and ethical responsibility*, on the one hand, and of the *respect for the mind*, on the other hand, and at replacing both with standardized control mechanisms, in other words, at the final victory of fascism, not in its crude literal, but in a refined, sublimated form. Certainly, there *is* ground for despair.

But then, considering the nature of the high-level responses to my essay and the reception it got from this journal and its editor, I can also say that my above-mentioned confidence in the process of thought is nourished.

With **Terry Pulver’s** response we get some spice into the discussion. I welcome his high-caliber criticism as an excellent opportunity for me to make a few crucial distinctions. First of all, Pulver responds to my arguments to a large extent on a personalistic, clinical level. For example, he so to speak draws what I said about the globetrotting woman into the sphere of an imaginary consulting room. This is a category mistake, a confounding of “genres.” To be sure, I am of the opinion that my *theoretical* argument, inasmuch as it pertains to *psychological* theory, is in itself therapeutic. But it is concerned with the “therapy of ideas” (David Miller), not of people. The “patient” is certain views, mindsets, expectations. Thus the whole fantasy of personal countertransference reactions is out of place here. The personal form of my statements in connection with the globetrotting woman is merely rhetorical, not an indication of a shift to a clinical perspective. Because Pulver does not respect the two distinct integrities of the genres, each of which has its own rules, but acts as if the personalistic-clinical way of looking at things could be applied just like that to theoretical discussions too, he also repeatedly argues *in personam*, analyzing my alleged emotions. But whether I as private individual feel one way or another is, in the context of an argument, neither here nor there. This mingling of spheres tends to obscure the issues.

Let’s just take the ego ideal he imputes to me, “*to be grown up.*” As far as ego ideals go, this one would not be half bad—were it not for the problem that all ideals have, namely, that they constantly defer into the future the very thing that they are about and ipso facto idealize it, while holding us down in the stance of wishful thinking. But my argument is about something totally different. I am not at stake. Ideals are not at stake. Rather, I argued that the cultural psyche, as it is “objectively” invested in the logical structure of the arts, the economy, the organization of society, etc., already *is* in the status of psychological adulthood, but that the subjective consciousness lags behind. One may disagree with my assessment, but then one would have to tackle my argument about a public situation and a subjective necessity, rather than reducing it to something personal and to something that has the form of an ideal.

Now I come to another crucial distinction. It might be very helpful to have my views critically reviewed from the point of view of another school of psychology, but here Pulver applies his—basically Lacanian—expectations and categories *directly* to my thoughts, *without reflecting* the fundamental differences between the presuppositions underlying the two theoretical commitments. Just as there seems to be for him an unbroken continuity from the personalistic work in the consulting room to theoretical expositions, so he also seems to think that his own perspectives seamlessly extend into and over the territory of my ideas. But we have to keep in mind that in this encounter we are dealing with a “clash of civilizations,” the clash between the exclusive logic of the Lacanian and the inclusive logic of the Jungian/alchemical traditions. If this is forgotten, all sorts of equivocations and misconstruals will ensue.

One of the most fundamental concepts of Lacanian thinking is that of “unconscious desire,” and, as Lacan rightly sees, *if it is taken radically as a kind of first principle, it is the very logic of “desire” to be, on principle, unfulfillable.* This theory thus operates with the idea of an object of desire that nevertheless is absolutely transcendent for it. It includes something in its theory that it, within itself, explicitly sets outside of the sphere of its own possible experience. It is a theory of “radical heterogeneity,” exteriority.

This radically conceived desire and this heterogeneity are not a phenomenological fact, not the simple truth of the psyche. They are an interpretation (in Lacanian terminology, a “construct in the imaginary”).

In Jungian theory, by contrast, desire (whether radically understood or not) is not an eminent term at all; and Jungian theory is decidedly not a psychology of desire. One might say, rather, it is a psychology of what manifests of its own accord. That which manifests is here seen as image (image in a linguistic or poetic sense, not a literal picture), and about the image Jung states, “Above all, don’t let anything from outside, that does not belong, get into it, for the fantasy-image has ‘everything it needs’ within itself.” No radical transcendence. With the concept of image, a dissociation into signifiers and signified, so fundamental to Lacanian thinking, is here absolutely out of the question. Alchemical psychology, too, does not proceed from the idea of desire. It starts out with the prime matter which has the spirit Mercurius and the potential of the *lapis* within itself from the outset. If the final goal is still unfulfilled, it is so only practically, not logically. Implicitly, although not explicitly, the fulfillment is already there. Alchemical thinking is (implicitly) dialectical *avant la lettre*.

The “image” with its inclusive nature is not a phenomenological fact either. It is also a presupposition. So we are confronted with two opposite presuppositions, with which all further thought and experience is prejudged one way or the other. Since “the facts” do not relieve us of a decision by showing the one presupposition to be the truth, the other an untruth, we have to make our own intellectual choice (Beebe) on our own responsibility. The position I have chosen makes me put the question to the other party: What does it mean for “the soul,” do to “the soul,” if we approach it with a thought form that a priori structures all possible experience and thinking in terms of the systematic dissociation that goes right through its central concept, desire? For me, at any rate, it is the very definition of psychology to be the discipline of *interiority*. (Interiority pure and simple.

This definition defines the field syntactically, through a certain logical form, not semantically by delimiting the range of its possible contents.)

Now one might say that Pulver's Lacanian approach is a discipline of interiority, for does it not teach the subject to focus on his unconscious desire, on his subjectivity, on his existence and his death? But all these ideas represent the "inner" only positivized as semantic contents of psychological consciousness, while leaving intact the dissociative and exclusive logical structure or syntax of this consciousness itself. I hail Pulver's plea for a "nonreified notion of the ego." But in my view it is not enough to act out the "death of the ego" in personal analysis and on the experiential level, while this ego rises from the ashes in the very *form* of the theory. In the notion of "desire" with its companion notion of the "lost object," the old ego and the hypostatizing have their well-camouflaged hiding place and stronghold: true, no longer in the experiencing subject, but now in the logic of the theory about the subject. Externalizing, excluding, erecting a beyond, dissociating: these *are* activities of the ego.

Now we are ready to look at a few of Pulver's objections. He thinks that my "effort to eliminate the metaphysical concept of the unconscious in favor of a Hegelian theory of self-consciousness" will not be able to "cover the full domain of phenomena in question without loss or remainder" and insists that there are "psychical operations which go on without the benefit of consciousness." Here we see that he inserts his undialectical, exclusive notion of consciousness into my thesis. If we were to proceed from this exclusive concept, I would myself readily agree with his objection. But my notion of consciousness is dialectical, inclusive: consciousness is within itself the unity of itself and its other, unconsciousness. Of course there are unconscious operations for me, too. I am not trying to eliminate awareness of them, but merely to overcome the reified notion of both the unconscious and consciousness as well as the dissociation (literal opposition) between them. If Pulver had followed the logic inherent in his own insight, that the death of the ego does not amount to the death of the human being, he might have realized that the death of "*the* unconscious" does not amount to a curtailment of "the full domain of phenomena" either.

As to the dialectic of self-relation and self-consciousness: does Pulver indeed believe that from the standpoint of undialectical thinking one could disprove that dialectic and show that it "does not in truth capture the movements of unconscious desire"? By looking into the mirror of its other (dialectical, inclusive thinking), Lacanian thinking does not discover the truth about *Hegelian dialectics*, it naturally discovers only tautologically *its own* premise, its constitutive presupposition: the logically expelled remainder or lost object. Of course this lost object "escapes the net of the relation to self" because the relation to self is not a net to catch something outside of itself in the first place.

But quite apart from the question of the general validity of a theory of self-relation, if we stick to the image, then at least the one phenomenon of Jung's dream of the yogin who had Jung's face shows that my interpretation of it in terms of self-relation is justified. In 1798, Novalis wrote a distich,

A single one succeeded—he lifted the veil of the Goddess at SaVs—
But what did he see? He saw—miracle of miracles—HIMSELF.
(my translation)

It is possible that Jung knew this distich. Be that as it may, it is as if his yogin dream unconsciously followed its model, even down to the fact that Jung also expected to see a Goddess, namely an image of the Virgin on the altar (or the crucifix), instead of this yogin. The dream initiates into a consciousness of self-relation, and the notion of self-relation *is* the overcoming of the reified notion of the ego. The Other, instead of being wholly other, proves to be himself: a circular (uroboric), *reflexive* logic. There is nothing here that would point to an unconscious desire or a lost object. Only as long as there is the—logically—unlifted veil, the lost object set up as irrevocably transcendent, do you need (and get) “*the unconscious.*”

Pulver’s exclusive logic is also responsible for his militaristic interpretation of my position. On the one hand he imagines “Giegerich’s truly modern man armed with his Hegelian dialectic” against the constantly disturbing movements of unconscious desire which escape the said net of the relation to self and lets the same modern man “[march] down the road toward the shibboleth of absolute knowledge.” On the other hand he ascribes to me “the battle cry”: “have the courage” (even “the heroic bravery”) “to face the wasteland.” The fantasy of this armor and of this march are the result of his reading my theses, which come from the standpoint of the inclusive logic, with his expectations stemming from his exclusive logic. The fact that I do away with the concept of *the unconscious* must appear to that logic as a defense (and thus as a fear, maybe cowardice) for which this armor is needed, whereas what really happened in my thinking is that the former unconscious has merely been logically integrated into the concept of consciousness. This has already been explained above. But what needs to be stressed here is that the conception of Hegelian dialectics as an “armor” and as a “march forward” is a contradiction in terms. Impossible.

The other side, the heroic bravery of embracing the bleak wasteland, is the result of the undialectical opposition of totally “false” (the modern situation as wasteland) and right or authentic (the concern for one’s subjectivity, one’s existence and one’s death). I am critical of this opposition as well as of its two sides. To begin with the concern for one’s existence and one’s death, I think that this is no doubt a worthwhile interest. But to believe, as Lacan seems to be doing, that this interest is the true opposite of what he describes as leisure-time pleasures and that it might be “the solution to our postmodern alienation” (Pulver), I find naive. What is personal psychoanalysis other than one of the prime modern leisure-time “pleasures”? How is it different from detective novels, etc.—except that it is less superficial, more complex and sophisticated, on a higher intellectual or spiritual level, and more elitist and expensive? Whether making oneself forget one’s death, e.g., through watching TV, or remembering one’s death in analysis is not what makes the real difference. Both are variations on the same *merely semantic* level. The life of the soul, the dimension in which the syntactic or logical changes take place, is forgotten in either case. As also Jung’s personal individuation process, psychoanalysis has its place (and importance) in the only-private sphere, in the *opus parvum*, and no importance beyond that.

On the other side, I have gone to great pains in my essay to critique “the feeling of loss and need,” the negative reading of what *is* (Jung’s “banality” of everyday life) and thus implicitly also any possible denouncement of our reality as only a bleak wasteland. I find it too bad then that Pulver imputes to me both the idea of

wanting to embrace reality precisely in its exclusive “wasteland” definition and of praising the merely “quotidian” and that he restricts the term “production” to a very narrow sense instead of its comprehensive sense (as a translation of Greek *poiêsis*). Here again he surreptitiously inserts his concept into my thesis. Apart from the fact that my theory is not at all about our heroically *embracing* anything (it is the exact opposite: the view that that which already *is* needs to *come home* to consciousness), I see our modern situation determined by the following two features:

- In modernity there has been a fundamental severing in the soul. There are now two logically independent spheres, that of the private/subjective/personal and that of the public/(in a certain sense) “objective”/official life of the soul; of leisure-time and workaday; of vacation and job; of faith and knowledge. The distinction is not new; what is new is that it has solidified into a rupture and thereby formed two largely independent systems. In former times there was an unbroken continuity between both, individual faith and spiritual needs seamlessly merging with public truths and the latter largely covering personal needs. If one wants to *imagine* this dissociation, one could view it as a vertical duplication of the one level of life into two, a two-storied situation. The “lower” one consists of what used to be the private *side* of the former one level of life. Here the *opus parvum* of the soul takes place. What happens and engages us emotionally here is *logically* “past,” “obsolete,” “disengaged”: *merely* semantic, because it is the logical/psychological incorporation of the former mythical and metaphysical consciousness (or world) *as a whole* into the new consciousness, as a mere sublated moment within the latter, which in turn represents the “upper” story of psychological life, that level on which today’s *opus magnum* of the soul takes place. In other words, it is the place where today the soul’s real action is, where those decisions and transformations occur that are not only semantic, but affect precisely *the syntax or logic* of man’s whole mode of being-in-the-world.
- On this new level of consciousness, or rather in this, the real and only, arena for the soul’s magnum opus, we find all the modern problems that Pulver and Lacan discuss under the title of “false objectifications” and I discuss under that of “positivization” (therefore my interest as a psychologist in logical negativity). But this falseness is for me no reason to denounce our modern world undialectically as the bleakest of wastelands and as the opposite of soul, nor to lament, in the manner of cultural criticism, that it is in particular our *modern* fate to have to live in such a wasteland. Every age has to find, *within* the predicament it finds itself in, its own way to the waters of life anew. The predicament may be different in type at different times, but it is a constant. Alchemy has taught me that each *prima materia* is a *massa confusa* and that each *massa confusa*, as bleak, pathological, and soulless as it may look, has everything it needs within itself, even, nay, precisely spirit and soul. In this sense, as of

the world of any age I dialectically conceive also of this world of our public truths today as the unity and difference of wasteland and paradise: "wasteland-paradise." And when I move (to quote Pulver) "From Inflation to the Ordinary," I do not land myself in the derogatory and merely compensatory "quotidian," but position human existence—equally distant from denouncement and inflation—on the hyphen that separates and unites wasteland and paradise.

When Pulver states, "There is, after all, still a meaning. . . . even if, it is true, it is not the Meaning of Life in the (old) mythical or religious sense, it is nevertheless the meanings of a life which the particulars of an individual life history provide," then he has me fully on his side. But when he attributes to this lower-case meaning a relevance beyond that within the private or leisure-time sphere, a relevance for the *whole* and as an answer to the modern predicament as such, I disagree. Because this would mean to ignore the *status* of the needs of our subjective existence, namely, that they have logically, as it were, precipitated from the whole as a sediment largely disconnected from where the soul's action is. It would mean to hold on to the belief that there still is only one level or story of life. But in the face of the experienced duality and alienation of the two dimensions, the fiction of such a singleness of story, the fiction of a relevance of the subjective meaning for the whole, can only be maintained through a moralistic division into falseness here (the denouncement of our "materialistic," "scientistic," "spiritless" world) and true value there (the inflated importance of "not forgetting our subjectivity"). The price of this strategy of counterfactually retaining logical unity through moralistic division is that the world of our public truths, the world of the opus magnum (of science, capitalism, etc.) is systematically deprived of soul and cast to the wolves, ipso facto condemned to turn into, and stay, the very wasteland that one then deploras. *Lapis in via ejectus*, the Stone thrown out, on the street.